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1.  Introduction 
 
 In this paper, I draw parallels between the literatures on the effects of law on the 
financial development of countries and on the effects of accounting standards on financial 
reporting outcomes.  My central thesis is that these literatures are complementary in 
terms of what they have to say about understanding the effects of law, regulations and 
accounting standards on economic and financial reporting outcomes.  Moreover, both 
literatures suggest that U.S. securities laws and financial reporting standards have taken a 
more regulatory direction over time.  I then take these themes and draw implications for 
the effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around 
the world at the time of adoption and over time.   
The adoption of IFRS around the world is occurring rapidly under the assumption 
that there will be benefits from having a uniform set of standards for financial reporting 
around the world so that cross-country comparisons of firms will be easier and more 
transparent.  However, that goal will not be fully realized unless the underlying 
institutional and economic factors evolve to become more similar as well, which seems 
unlikely (or at least more costly and time-consuming than changing accounting 
standards).  Moreover, if the underlying institutional and economic factors do not become 
similar across countries over time, then the goal of similar financial reporting outcomes is 
not likely be a desirable economic outcome. 
 Research in the accounting literature convincingly concludes that accounting 
standards alone do not determine financial reporting outcomes (see for example, Ball, 
Robin and Wu (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) or the survey by Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008)).  By financial reporting outcomes, I mean the quality of financial 
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reporting, measured in a variety of ways that we observe in different countries.  Many 
forces shape the quality of financial reporting, and accounting standards should be 
viewed as but one of those forces.  Indeed, the international accounting literature suggests 
that the effect of accounting standards alone may be weak relative to the effects of forces 
such as managers’ incentives, auditor quality and incentives, regulation, enforcement, 
ownership structure and other institutional features of the economy in determining the 
outcome of the financial reporting process. 
 Mahoney (2008) suggests that small nuances in how securities laws are used and 
enforced can lead to large differences in observed outcomes.  Coffee (2007) argues that 
differences in enforcement intensity may help explain how large differences in economic 
outcomes arise from seemingly minor differences in formal legal rules.  Mahoney 
concludes that legal indices like those used in papers such as La Porta et al. (1997) miss 
large differences in legal institutions because coding substantive and procedural rules 
fails to capture how the law is actually used.  Coffee (2007) concludes that understanding 
not the enforcement rules, but how enforcement is carried out as measured both by inputs 
and outputs, is much more important for understanding differences in economic outcomes 
than the enforcement rules “on the books”.  In light of those issues, some authors (e.g., 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)) have begun to use survey-
based measures by asking local attorneys how a particular transaction or situation would 
be handled in a particular country. 
 Mahoney (2008) goes on to argue that U.S. securities laws have evolved over 
time from a system aimed at facilitating contracting among parties to one that is more 
regulatory in nature and less useful for facilitating contracting because of changes made 
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by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Ball (2008) makes a 
related point about financial accounting standards, arguing that regulation encourages a 
“rules-based” approach to financial reporting over a “principles-based” approach, where 
the latter emphasizes the notion that the accounting disclosures fairly represent the 
company’s financial position as opposed to the former, which emphasizes compliance 
over substance. 
 All of these issues have implications for the financial reporting effects of IFRS 
around the world at the time of adoption and over time.  In particular, the impact of a 
common set of accounting standards across countries is unlikely to lead to similar 
financial reporting outcomes across countries unless the other forces that govern the 
quality of financial statements become more similar across countries as well.  Indeed, it is 
not at all obvious that similar financial reporting outcomes would lead to greater 
economic efficiency given cross-country differences in the other institutional features of 
the economies.  Further, even if common accounting standards are adopted, it is likely 
that regulatory forces will force differences in IFRS across countries over time unless the 
underlying institutional features of the economies become similar over time. 
 In Section 2, I discuss the evidence of the effect of financial reporting standards 
on financial reporting outcomes.  In Section 3, I discuss the economic consequences of 
how the law and regulation are actually used, drawing heavily on Mahoney (2008).  I 
then go on to discuss the likely importance of enforcement on financial reporting 
outcomes in Section 4.  Finally, I make some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
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2.  The Effect of Financial Reporting Standards on Financial Reporting Outcomes   
Evidence from the international accounting literature concludes that accounting 
standards alone do not determine the quality of the financial reporting outcomes.  This is 
not to say that standards don’t matter at all, but rather that there are many forces that 
shape the quality of financial reporting and accounting standards should be viewed as but 
one of these.  These forces include managers’ incentives, auditor quality and incentives, 
regulation, enforcement, ownership structure and other institutional features of the 
economy. 
Several papers provide empirical evidence on the effect of accounting standards 
on financial reporting outcomes.  For example, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003), henceforth 
BRW, show that financial reporting quality was low in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand despite presumably high quality reporting standards because the 
institutional structure provided incentives to issue low-quality reports. BRW argue that 
countries that want to increase financial reporting quality have to think about changes in 
manager and auditor incentives and other institutional features and that those may be 
more important than mandating higher quality reporting standards.  They also argue that 
the pressure to reduce variation in accounting standards across countries will not resolve 
differences in the quality of financial reporting.1   
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine the extent of earnings management 
across three different types of economies:  (1) outsider economies with large stock 
markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights and strong legal enforcement 
(Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, UK, Norway, Canada, Australia and USA); (2) 
                                                 
1 See Holthausen (2003) for a discussion of Ball, Robin and Wu (2003). 
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insider economies with less well-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak 
investor rights, but strong legal enforcement (Austria, Taiwan, Germany, Switzerland, 
France and Sweden); and (3) economies that are similar to the insider economy described 
above but with weak legal enforcement (Thailand, Greece, Korea, Spain and India).  
They find increasing earnings management as they move from economies (1) to (3) 
indicating that institutional forces such as the extent of investor protection substantially 
shape financial reporting outcomes.  Further, they find more earnings management in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia than any other country in the first cluster, consistent 
with BRW. 
Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006) compare the properties of U.S. GAAP accounting 
numbers for U.S. firms and for foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. and show that the 
quality of the U.S. GAAP earnings numbers is higher for the U.S. firms than the cross-
listed firms, but also that the cross-listed firms have higher earnings quality than the non-
cross-listed firms from the same country.  They also provide evidence that suggests that 
earnings quality for firms cross listed in the U.S. is lower for firms that come from 
countries with weaker local investor protection and they speculate that the lower standard 
of U.S. public and private enforcement on foreign cross-listed firms relative to U.S. firms 
(see Siegel (2005) and Frost and Pownall (1994)) is part of the reason for the observed 
differences.  
Leuz (2006) argues that the degree of concentration in ownership structures affects 
manager’s incentives to manage earnings and provides evidence that more concentrated 
ownership structures result in greater earnings management.  Leuz argues that even if 
enforcement were held constant, ownership structure, home-country market forces and 
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varying incentives for earnings management would lead to differences in the quality of 
financial reports.  Thus, as long as there is discretion in financial reporting (and it is hard 
to believe that discretion could or should ever be eliminated), even strict enforcement will 
not successfully eliminate all of the variation in reporting quality. 
Other studies, such as Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler, Hail and 
Leuz (2006),  among others, support the view that changes in standards alone will not 
lead to substantially similar financial reporting outcomes and that again the standards 
may be less important than the other institutional features of the reporting and legal 
environment. 
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2007) provide evidence that the effects of voluntary 
adoption of IFRS on market liquidity and the cost of capital depend on whether the 
voluntary adopters make a serious commitment to transparency; they find that only those 
making a commitment to transparency experience significant capital market effects.  
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find that the capital market benefits associated with 
mandatory adoption of IFRS occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be 
transparent and where legal enforcement is strong.  Thus both of these papers suggest that 
the mere adoption of IFRS does not lead to similar financial reporting outcomes, at least 
not initially. 
The conclusions of these studies are hardly unexpected.  Market and incentive 
forces are indeed powerful and hence it is not surprising that financial reporting outcomes 
will be strongly influenced by incentives of managers and auditors, the nature of the 
ownership structure of corporations, other market and political forces in the home 
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country and the degree of enforcement in the home country, even if accounting standards 
are held constant.   
3.  The Economic Consequences of the Use of Law 
Mahoney (2008) briefly traces the development of securities laws in the United 
States.  He argues that U.S. Securities Laws started out to facilitate contracting between 
managers, owners and other financial intermediaries and that slowly over time the SEC 
and Congress have added a large number of regulatory features.  For example, he points 
to the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Securities Exchange Act of 1964, the 
Williams Act of 1968, rules adopted on the routing of trades to various markets in the 
1990s and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as movements to a more regulatory 
environment for securities.  Mahoney poses the question of whether the recent decline in 
the United States’ share of global capital raising is due to its more regulatory regime, 
including the recent passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.   
Mahoney (2008) also argues that how law is used, not the laws per se, can have 
fundamental economic consequences as various agents figure out how to exploit the law 
to their own advantage.  He discusses two unintended uses of law that led to substantially 
different enforcement mechanisms; one private and the other public.  The first is an 
example of an apparently small rule change with large economic consequences; the 
second is an example of innovation in the use of existing laws.  
Mahoney’s first example is a 1966 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 (the class-action rule).  Prior to 1966, Rule 23 did not bind any members of a class to a 
lawsuit unless they had formally opted to join the suit.  The amendment to Rule 23 
changed the default position such that potential members of a class were included unless 
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they chose to opt out of the class. This change essentially made it possible for plaintiff’s 
attorneys to provide the defendants with a mechanism for determining their exposure by 
settling with the entire class which was generally not feasible before because individual 
attorneys did not represent most of the class.  Mahoney provides evidence that the 
number of class-action suits increased subsequent to this rule change and those firms with 
greater capitalization and higher share turnover experienced more negative returns in the 
period in which class-action suits began to emerge in record numbers.  Subsequent U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
reversed this trend and led to a decline in the extent of class-action suits.   
Mahoney’s second example is the use of the Martin Act by Eliot Spitzer, then 
New York State Attorney General, to bring criminal actions against individual securities 
analysts and their firms for conflicts of interest that he alleged violated the Martin Act.  
There was no change in the law that triggered its use; rather it was just the recognition 
that an existing law could be used to bring criminal actions against individuals and 
corporations.  Mahoney concludes that “through these prosecutions, Spitzer became a de 
facto regulator of the U.S. securities markets alongside, the SEC.”    Another example, 
the 2003 Justice Department “Thompson Memorandum”, allowed Federal prosecutors to 
demand that firms that were under the threat of indictment would agree to not pay legal 
expenses for individual officers and employees. This innovative use of existing rules 
allowed federal prosecutors to put pressure on companies to take actions those companies 
would not have otherwise taken in order to avoid indictment.  This continued until the 
Thompson Memorandum was rescinded by the Justice Department in 2006.   
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Mahoney argues that prosecution risk increased so much in the early 2000’s that it 
may also help explain the sharp decline in the listing of foreign firms in the U.S.  As 
corroborating evidence he points to the evidence in Duarte, Kong, Siegel and Young 
(2007) which suggests that foreign companies are less likely to cross-list in the U.S. after 
2002 if an extradition treaty exists between the U.S. and the home country of the foreign 
company.  Of course, there are alternative explanations for the decline in U.S. listings.  
One such explanation is the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Piotroski and Srinivasan 
(2008)).  Another explanation is that the advantage of listing in the U.S. relative to say 
London’s Main Market has not changed, but the characteristics of firms listing has 
changed which means that they aren’t listing as often in the U.S. (Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2008).  A third alternative explanation is that an improvement in the desirability of 
competitor markets (mainly in Europe) coupled with increased regulatory costs in the 
U.S. post 2002 have led to the decline in new listings in the U.S. (Zingales (2007)). 
 How does all of this relate to the literature on accounting standards?  The 
literature on accounting standards indicates that it is not just the standards per se that 
matter for financial reporting outcomes; it is incentives and other institutional factors as 
well.  Mahoney makes a similar point here with respect to the law.  Individuals who use 
the law have an incentive to use it for their own benefit and are continually looking for 
new ways to use existing law to their own advantage.  Thus, incentives will shape the 
economic consequences of the law, similar to how incentives and other attributes affect 
financial reporting outcomes as documented in the international accounting literature.2 
 
                                                 
2 I should note that laws and accounting standards if enforced adequately also have the potential to affect 
individual’s incentives.  Thus, there need not be a one-way effect from incentives to accounting standards 
and laws. 
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4.  The Economic Consequences of Enforcement 
In the international accounting literature that looks at the effect of accounting 
standards on financial reporting outcomes, we don’t yet have very specific evidence of 
the main factors that shape financial reporting outcomes.  As I mentioned previously, 
Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006) provide evidence that the reporting quality for U.S. firms 
is higher than the reporting quality of foreign firms cross-listed in the United States and 
Leuz (2006) provides at least preliminary evidence that ownership concentration is 
important in determining financial reporting outcomes when comparing the financial 
reporting quality of U.S. firms to foreign firms cross-listed in the United States.  Further, 
as I also indicated Frost and Pownall (1994) and Siegel (2005) suggest that both public 
and private enforcement of foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. is weaker than it is for 
U.S. firms.   
 If, as argued above, enforcement is weaker for foreign firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. than for U.S. firms, it is not surprising that the financial reporting outcomes are not 
the same because cross-listed firms are still subject to home-country institutions and 
market forces.  The weaker enforcement of firms cross-listed in the U.S. allows the other 
factors that affect financial reporting quality, such as concentration of ownership, to 
operate with more force as managers of the cross-listed firms do not face the same costs 
as their U.S. counterparts in responding to various incentives that make them want to 
shape their financial reports in certain ways. 
Yet the fact that cross-listed firms engage in less earnings management than non-
cross-listed firms from the same countries (Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006), Leuz (2006)) 
suggests that U.S. enforcement of cross-listed firms matters even if that enforcement is 
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weaker for cross-listed firms than for U.S. firms. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) also provide evidence on the importance of 
enforcement for financial reporting outcomes.  Taken together, this evidence suggests 
that the degree of enforcement is one of many important factors that will drive variation 
in financial reporting outcomes with the widespread adoption of IFRS.  Enforcement will 
matter in that setting and could well be an important influence on outcomes (but certainly 
not the only important influence on outcomes).   
At this point, I do not think we have very strong evidence to help us fully 
understand the importance of enforcement with respect to financial reporting outcomes as 
IFRS is adopted around the world or which elements of enforcement are important in 
determining outcomes. That said, even if enforcement were uniformly strict across 
countries, we would not anticipate that the financial reporting outcomes would be the 
same because the other forces will continue to affect outcomes to some extent.  
Ultimately financial reporting outcomes will represent a trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of more informative financial reports (absent the effects of enforcement) and the 
local enforcement regime. 
 The most direct evidence on the role of enforcement that I am aware of with 
respect to financial reporting quality associated with the adoption of IFRS is from Daske, 
Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) who study the capital-market effects around the introduction 
of mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries.  They find that the capital-market benefits 
(market liquidity, cost of capital) around the time of IFRS adoption occur only in 
countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is 
strong.  They also find that capital-market effects are strongest for member states of the 
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European Union where simultaneous efforts were made to improve governance and 
enforcement. 
While the evidence on enforcement with respect to accounting standards is 
provocative, it isn’t as compelling or as robust as we might like.  Moreover, it is 
interesting to ask whether we have used appropriate measures of enforcement in the 
international accounting literature.  If our measures of enforcement or the legal 
environment are noisy, then we might well find that better measures of enforcement and 
the legal environment would yield even stronger impacts of enforcement on the quality of 
financial reporting outcomes.  In that spirit, perhaps we can learn from the legal literature 
on measuring the legal environment and enforcement. 
Mahoney (2008) argues that the fundamental challenge to researchers who attempt to 
identify the legal determinants of financial outcomes is measuring a country’s legal 
environment.  Mahoney points to the minor amendments to Rule 23 and the innovation in 
the use of the pre-existing Martin Act that led to large changes in the legal environment, 
in this case to the extent of private and public enforcement of securities laws.  Mahoney 
goes on to say that one would not expect the coding of existing rules to capture how the 
law is actually used.  As I mentioned previously, this has caused researchers to consider 
alternative measures for the legal environment, such as the survey of attorneys across 
countries carried out by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2005) and 
Balas, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2007). 
Coffee (2007) argues that the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) 
measures of enforcement are likely deficient because they measure the rules on the 
books, similar to the concerns raised by Mahoney (2008).  Coffee argues instead that 
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measures of enforcement that rely on inputs and outputs are likely to be superior and that 
measures of enforcement should include both public and private measures of 
enforcement. 
Jackson (2007) appears to have been one of the first to attempt to measure 
enforcement using enforcement inputs and outputs across countries.  Variables such as 
the size of a regulator’s budget and staff relative to some measure of market 
capitalization or GDP might be a relevant “input” measure.  The number of enforcement 
actions brought by the regulator and some assessment of the penalties imposed (monetary 
and perhaps jail terms) again relative to some appropriate scalar might be useful “output” 
measures.  One of the issues of course is trying to figure out how to scale the various 
measures of enforcement in a cross-country study when the size of the markets and the 
available legal and regulatory enforcement mechanisms differ considerably. 
Jackson and Roe (2008) measure public enforcement powers using proxies for the 
real resources available to regulators (staffing levels and budgets).  Their measures are 
significantly associated with standard measures of stock market development (stock 
market capitalization, trading volume, the number of domestic firms and the number of 
IPOs) across countries.  Further, they provide evidence that their measures of public 
enforcement are generally as important as measures of private enforcement in explaining 
their measures of stock market development.  They argue that La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2006) erroneously conclude that public enforcement does not matter 
because of their measurement of enforcement as formal rules of enforcement power as 
opposed to measures that describe the real resources available to regulators for 
enforcement.  Jackson and Roe also provide evidence that common law origins do not 
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have a significant relationship with stock market capitalization once they control for 
enforcement.3  Coffee (2007) argues that measuring actual enforcement cases and fines 
could also be extremely important.  Thus, despite the fact that Jackson and Roe only have 
input measures in their study, they still find evidence supporting the strong association 
between public enforcement and economic development. 
Inferring causality is of course an important and difficult task in this case.  Does stock 
market capitalization affect enforcement budgets or do enforcement budgets affect stock 
market capitalization?  Jackson and Roe (2008) discuss this issue explicitly but do not 
come to any definitive conclusions in my opinion.  At this point I do not think we can 
rule out the possibility that financial development leads to the creation of larger 
enforcement institutions and budgets.  Nevertheless, the measures of enforcement are 
interesting to consider, especially when thinking about the effects of the adoption of 
IFRS.  In tests which might examine the role of enforcement on financial reporting 
outcomes associated with the adoption of IFRS, the causality issues will not be as severe 
since we have the practically simultaneous adoption of IFRS across many countries 
where the enforcement regimes are quite different. 
Jackson (2007), Coffee (2007) and Jackson and Roe (2008) discuss the wide variation 
in enforcement across countries as measured by enforcement inputs and outputs.  While 
these measures may be superior to other measures of enforcement used in the literature, 
we should be careful not to assume that it is the budget per se that matters.  It is likely 
that in countries where stricter securities regulations are adopted, that the country will 
also see to it that an adequate regulator will be put in place to police those regulations 
                                                 
3 This suggests that there may be an important correlated omitted variable in accounting studies which 
attribute large differences in the quality of financial reports across countries to whether the country has a 
common law or code law origin (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000)). 
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with a budget that allows that to occur.  So while the input and output measures may turn 
out to be reliable measures of enforcement, we shouldn’t interpret that as the sole factor 
that determines enforcement.  In other words, increasing enforcement budgets in 
countries with lax securities regulations on the books need not lead to any stronger 
enforcement. 
 Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find evidence that IFRS adoption affected 
companies’ capital-market measures only in countries with incentives to be transparent 
and where there was strong legal enforcement.  The enforcement effects may even be 
stronger than suggested in Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi because they use the rule of law 
index from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), which does not rely on either input 
or output measures of enforcement .  As such, if we were to measure enforcement inputs 
and outputs, we might find a much stronger role for enforcement in explaining variation 
in financial reporting outcomes following the adoption of IFRS.  
 If indeed enforcement is an important factor in determining financial reporting 
outcomes, we should anticipate large variation in the consequences of adopting IFRS, due 
in part to variation in enforcement activities around the world documented in the above 
cited legal literature.  But as I have mentioned previously, variation in financial reporting 
outcomes will not just be driven by variation in enforcement but by all of the forces that 
shape managers’ reporting incentives. 
 One place for future research would be to try to investigate the effects of changes 
in enforcement on reporting outcomes. If enforcement is an important factor in 
determining financial reporting outcomes, we should anticipate variation in the financial 
reporting outcomes associated with IFRS due to variation in enforcement activities 
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around the world.  Here we have at best scant, but enticing evidence.  Daske, Hail, Leuz 
and Verdi (2008) find that the capital-market effects they measure are stronger in 
member states of the European Union, which they suggest was due to the EU’s efforts to 
improve governance and enforcement which was taking place concurrently with the 
adoption of IFRS.  While this is interesting, it is of course a crude measure.  Looking for 
places where enforcement changed and other institutions were held constant might lead 
us to a further understanding on the role of enforcement.  Leuz and Wysocki (2008) also 
indicate that further research on enforcement could yield large payoffs in our 
understanding of the effects of disclosure regulations. 
5.  Concluding Comments 
 Studies of the impact of accounting standards on financial reporting outcomes 
point to a variety of factors that influence those outcomes and suggest that the accounting 
standards may not be as important as incentives, enforcement, ownership structure and 
other market and legal forces.  The reliability of the empirical measures of all of these 
factors is of course important in assessing whether a particular factor is important.  
Recent work in the legal literature suggests that existing measures of the legal 
environment and enforcement may be noisy.  The recent legal literature further suggests 
that measures of both public enforcement and private enforcement are correlated with 
capital market outcomes and that public enforcement is likely to be as important as 
private enforcement.  As such, it is conceivable that enforcement has an important effect 
on how the adoption of IFRS affects financial reporting outcomes.  To the extent that 
enforcement varies substantially across countries, we are likely to see correspondingly 
wide variation in financial reporting outcomes.  While enforcement may prove to be an 
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important determinant of financial reporting outcomes, it can only mitigate the influence 
of other factors that are known to affect financial reporting outcomes.  Only the 
alignment of the overall portfolio of countries’ institutional and economic forces 
affecting financial reporting outcomes will lead to more uniform financial reporting 
quality across countries.  Further, without the alignment of this portfolio of countries’ 
institutional and economic forces, uniform financial reporting quality across countries, 
even if achievable, is not likely result in substantive economic benefits in all countries. 
Ball (2008) discusses the increasingly rules-based approach of U.S. regulators to 
accounting standards and Mahoney (2008) discusses the increasing regulatory focus of 
U.S. securities laws relative to the past.  An interesting question with regard to IFRS 
adoption is whether regulators in each country will start to offer interpretations and 
guidance on IFRS that will introduce differences in the standards across countries.  Since 
financial reporting is an endogenous outcome of the political and market forces within 
each country, this outcome seems likely.  As such, the “standards” themselves will 
become less uniform over time (and perhaps more rules-based and regulatory in flavor) 
which will lead to further differences in financial reporting over time, unless the 
underlying economic and institutional forces across countries become more similar. 
I would like to end on one cautionary note related to a point I made in Holthausen 
(2003) and also discussed by Leuz and Wysocki (2008). The issue is whether it is feasible 
to actually identify the most important determinants of financial disclosure quality at the 
country level.  While I have discussed the likely importance of enforcement in this paper, 
it is not obvious that in cross-country studies we can disentangle the effects of 
enforcement from that of all the other institutions, regulations and incentives within a 
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country.  Many institutions that are created within a country are complementary, designed 
with respect to the underlying economies and with respect to each other.  So while 
enforcement is undoubtedly important, countries with strong enforcement are likely to 
have regulations that are more stringent than countries with weak enforcement.  Thus, 
international studies that attempt to try to disentangle the effects of complementary 
institutions, incentives and ownership structures are not likely to be very convincing. 
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